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by Robert A. Destro
Editor's Note: As part of our two-year
series marking the bicentennial of the
Bill of Rights, Catholic University's
Robert A. Destro examines how we can
reach a consensus on the meaning of
the Bill of Rights despite speaking
different "dialects."
"It has been frequently re-
marked," wrote Alexander Hamil-
ton in Federalist No. 1, "that it seems
to have been reserved to the people
of this country, by their conduct and
example, to decide the important
question, whether societies of men
are really capable or not of establish-
ing good government from reflec-
tion and choice, or whether they are
forever destined to depend for their
political constitutions on accident
and force."' The alternatives are as
stark today as they were in 1787: re-
flection and choice versus accident
and force. When the issue is one of
organic principles, thereisno middle
ground.
This was the dilemma that the
States faced when they conditioned
ratification of the
Constitution on the addi-
tion of a Bill of Rights.
Unlike Hamilton and
Madison, the States were
not convinced that a fed-
eral government of lim-
ited powers could be
trusted to respect impor-
tant individual rights.
\ The freedoms guaran-
teed by the Bill of Rights
were simply too impor-
tant to take the chance
that a distant federal
government might view
protection of basic free-
doms as a priority. Only
the most thorough process of reflec-
tion and choice-the process of con-
stitutional amendment-would suf-
fice. The result was a Bill of Rights
that took into account the political,
cultural and religious diversity of a
nation and its people.
We would do well to keep
Hamilton's admonition firmly in
mind as we reflect on the meaning of
the Bill of Rights and the other
amendments that guarantee individ-
ual liberty and political participa-
tion. The lastdecade of the twentieth
century promises to be one of great
change in the world's political and
demographic landscape. If our con-
duct and example is to model how a
nation of reasonable people can agree
upon a vision of the common good
that seeks, in the words of the
Constitution's Preamble "to form a
more perfect Union, establish jus-
tice, insure. domestic tranquility,
provide for the common defence,
promote the general welfare, and
secure the blessings of liberty to
ourselves and our posterity," then
we must begin by reflecting upon
the ideal, the Bill of Rights itself, and
how it operates in practice. In short,
before we can reflect and choose, we
must understand the choices.
The Skin of Living Thoughts
"A word," wrote Holmes, "is not
a crystal, transparent and un-
changed, it is the skin of a living
thought and may vary greatly in
color and content according to the
circumstances and the time in which
it is used."2 This observation is par-
ticularly true as applied to current
legal and political controversies in-
volving the Bill of Rights. Though
the language the participants and
litigants use to describe their par-
ticularized vision of the common
good is that of the Bill of Rights,
there are critical differences in the
meanings attributed to its words.
Especially when applied to specific
cases such as religious liberty or
privacy, the meanings of words de-
pends not only upon the circum-
stances and the time in which they
are used, but also upon the back-
ground and experience of those us-
ing them.3 While the participants in
such discussions are using the same
words-"liberty," "equal protec-
tion," "cruel and unusual punish-
ment," and "respecting anestablish-
ment of religion," to mention only a
few-they are not really speaking
the same language. They are speak-
ing a dialect.
But this is neither surprising nor
particularly lamentable. America has
been a pluralistic society for as long
as there have been Americans. Our
native diversity guarantees the exis-
tence of important differences in
concept and vision. The Hamiltonian
challenge to those who would en-
gage in discourse about the Bill of
Rights is, first, to understand one
another. Then, and only then, can
we reflect upon and choose from
among the available alternatives.
Transcending the Dialects
But how do we go about foster-
ing such understanding and civil
discourse? Do we first need to de-
velop a common moral language? Is
it even possible to do so? So much
has been said and written over the
years about this topic that I shall not
even attempt it here.4 My view is
that we already have a basis for
understanding-the language of the
Bill of Rights itself. All that is left is
for us to learn to speak it with one
another as we debate, in specific
terms, the vision of the common good
embodied in the Bill of Rights and
Civil War Amendments.
But that is a tall order; for a lan-
guage is not merely a collection of
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visual or audible symbols having a
set meaning, but a means by which
people convey a wide range of ideas,
from the mundane to the profound.
Ourrespective cultural, religious and
political backgrounds and experi-
ence condition us both to speak and
to understand a familiar dialect. It is
our own; we are comfortable with it.
We respond favorably to its sound,
and are frustrated, if not insulted,
when it becomes clear that what we
thought we said was not what was
heard.5
In an important article entitled
Nomos and Narrative6 , the late Profes-
sor Robert M. Cover of the Yale Law
School wrote:
To live in a legal world requires
that one know not only the pre-
cepts, but also their connection
to possible and plausible states
of affairs. It requires that one
integrate not only the 'is' and the
'ought,' but the 'is,' the 'ought,'
and the 'what might be. 7
Since law may thus "be viewed as a
system of tension or a bridge linking
a concept of a reality to an imagined
alternative,"8 the language of the
cases, the treatises, the learned
commentary and the politics speaks
volumes about the law's (and law-
yers') vision of what is and what
ought to be.
The 'What Might Be'
Does anyone familiar with the
First Amendment doubt the impor-
tance of the metaphorical "wall of
separation" between church and
stateas a verbalbridgebetween what
is and what might be? Justice Wiley
Rutledge, dissenting in Everson v.
Board of Education, stated that "the
object [of the first amendment] was
broader than separating church and
state in [the] narrow sense [of pro-
hibiting an official church]. It was to
create a complete and permanent
separation of the spheres of religious
activity and civil authority by com-
prehensively forbidding every form
of public aid or support for religion."
Notably, however, Justice Rutledge
did not rely on the language of the
Bill of Rights itself: he spoke in dia-
lect-of his vision of the demands of
liberty. It goes without saying that
thereareotherwaysto envisionboth
"separation" and religious liberty.
Hamilton's challenge is to consider
and choose among them.
More recentlyJustice Blackmun,
writing for a plurality of the Court in
County of Allegheny v. American Civil
Liberties Union, wrote of the ""'logic
of secular liberty"' it is the purpose
of the Establishment Clause to pro-
tect."10 I, on the other hand, have
always believed that the purpose of
the Religion Clause was to protect
religious liberty. Do we disagree, or
are we simply speaking in dialect
about different things?
Professor Gerard Bradley of the
University of Illinois School of Law
has raised similar questions concern-
ing what Professor Laurence Tribe
describes as "rights of religious au-
tonomy." Is freedom of religion, as
Tribeseems to suggest, nothingmore
than the secular autonomy of indi-
viduals in matters of conscience
which depends for its protection on
a "still imperfect [judicial] vision of
a 'more perfect union,"'" or is it, as
Bradley argues, something more:
"immunity from state interference
on matters spiritual."12
Thus, if there is to be meaningful
discussion of the "proper" balance
of rights, duties and the common
good that is the Bill of Rights, it is in-
cumbent on all who would take part
in the discussion to heed both Cover
and Hamilton. Our ability to make
ourselves understood rests first on
our willingness to understand not
only our own concept of the "is" and
the "ought" but also the "is" and the
"ought" of our partners in discus-
sion. Then, and only then, will it be
possible toreflectand to choose some
mutually agreeable vision, imper-
fect though it mightbe, on the "what
might be." a
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